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WAYNE B. THOMAS**
General evidence indicates that managers manage earnings at three com-
mon earnings thresholds: analyst forecasts, prior period earnings, and
zero earnings. We examine one market-based motivation suggested for
this behavior. If managers perceive the market penalty for barely missing
an earnings threshold to be disproportionately high (i.e., a torpedo effect),
they may use discretion to manage earnings upward to meet the earnings
threshold. This market-based incentive would explain the evidence in
favor of earnings management at earnings thresholds. To test the existence
of a torpedo effect, we employ a comprehensive model that measures the
market’s reaction to reported earnings that barely miss earnings thresh-
olds. This model controls for the level of unexpected earnings and several
other firm characteristics known to affect the relation between returns and
earnings. Overall, we conclude that there is little evidence of a torpedo effect.
This conclusion holds for both low-growth and high-growth firms and is unaf-
fected by the firm’s history of meeting the threshold. Our paper dispels some
commonly held beliefs about the market’s response to earnings thresholds.
1. Introduction
Conventional wisdom, arising primarily from anecdotes in the business press
and asserted in some academic research, is that stock prices are disproportion-
ately affected by earnings that barely miss earnings thresholds (i.e., a torpedo
effect). Perhaps this belief originates from a speech given by Arthur Levitt, for-
mer commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). He states,
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Increasingly, I have become concerned that the motivation to meet Wall Street
earnings expectations may be overriding common sense business practices.
Too many corporate managers, auditors, and analysts are participants in a
game of nods and winks. In the zeal to satisfy consensus estimates and project
a smooth earnings path, wishful thinking may be winning the day over faithful
representation. As a result, I fear that we are witnessing an erosion in the qual-
ity of earnings, and therefore, the quality of financial reporting. Managing may
be giving way to manipulation; integrity may be losing out to illusion. . . .
While the problem of earnings manipulation is not new, it has swelled in a
market that is unforgiving of companies that miss their estimates. I recently
read of one major U.S. company, that failed to meet its so-called numbers by
one penny, and lost more than six percent of its stock value in one day. (Levitt
[1998])
Academic research has not provided a thorough test of this proposition.1 The
purpose of our study is to examine the market’s reaction to reported earnings that
barely miss earnings thresholds. We compare this reaction to reported earnings
that easily miss earnings thresholds. This comparison allows for a test of the ‘‘tor-
pedo’’ effect. For completeness, we also examine the market reaction to reported
earnings that barely meet and easily meet earnings thresholds.
One motivation for investigating the market’s reaction to reported earnings
around thresholds is that earnings management behavior could be related to market-
based incentives. If managers believe the market penalty is disproportionately
high for missing an earnings target, they have additional incentives to manipulate
earnings to achieve these thresholds. While discretion within Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) may allow for some manipulation of earnings, it is
not likely to help firms that will easily miss earnings targets. Instead, only those
firms whose true earnings will barely miss the earnings threshold are able to use
discretion within GAAP to manage reported earnings to meet the threshold, and
thereby avoid a potentially large market penalty. This scenario leads to the predic-
tion that, across the distribution of reported earnings, there will be an unusually
low (high) number of observations that barely miss (meet) the earnings threshold.
Academic research provides evidence consistent with this type of managerial
behavioral (e.g., Burgstahler & Dichev [1997]; DeGeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser
[1999]; Payne & Robb [2000]; Bartov, Givoly, & Hayn [2002]; Beatty, Ke, &
Petroni [2002]; Moehrle [2002]; Burgstahler & Eames [2003]; Das & Zhang
[2003]; Payne & Thomas [2003]; Brown & Caylor [2005]; Graham, Harvey, &
Rajgopal [2005]). The evidence in these studies is consistent with managers
attempting to avoid reporting a loss, avoid reporting an earnings decrease, and
1. In addition, there are certainly many anecdotes in which barely missing a threshold does not
result in an unusually large negative market reaction. For example, for the analyst forecast (prior pe-
riod earnings) [zero earnings] threshold, we find that 39.8 percent (44.7%) [41.7] of the observations
that barely miss the threshold have positive announcement period abnormal returns. This evidence is
inconsistent with a torpedo effect.
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avoid missing the analyst forecast.2 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) conclude that
their results provide evidence consistent with managers acting as though investors
price earnings differently based on the relation to earning thresholds. DeGeorge,
Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) suggest that managers first attempt to report a profit
and then to report earnings increases, and lastly they are concerned with meeting or
beating analysts’ forecasts. In contrast, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)
report that managers most prefer to avoid reporting an earnings decrease, while
Brown and Caylor (2005) show that achieving the analyst forecast threshold has
become the most important factor over time.
If manipulation within GAAP allows firms to use discretion to manage some
amount of earnings, why do any firms report earnings that barely miss an earnings
threshold? Is this an indication that all of the firm’s ‘‘reserves’’ within GAAP are
used up, leading to a particularly bleak outlook for the firm? Does this mean that
managers are not concerned with available discretion because they believe the firm
lacks future prospects? Are these managers simply not able to effectively use the
discretion that exists within GAAP, which could provide a strong signal of manage-
rial incompetence to investors? Are investors simply fixated on achieving thresh-
olds so that barely missing elicits a disproportionately strong psychological
response? These are some of the notions conjectured as possible reasons for a tor-
pedo effect. However, we contend that before attempting to understand the reasons
for any torpedo effect, a necessary condition is that a torpedo effect must exist. We
find no academic research providing convincing support for a torpedo effect, yet
many seem to believe that it exists. The purpose of our study is to provide direct
evidence of the possible existence of the torpedo effect.
We compare the market’s reaction to barely missing earnings thresholds with
the market’s reaction to easily missing and barely meeting earnings thresholds.
This differs from focusing on a comparison of simply meeting versus missing, as
we are interested in the existence of a torpedo effect from barely missing. Instead
of basing conclusions on average market reactions to announced earnings around
thresholds, we employ a comprehensive model that controls for the level of unex-
pected earnings at the time of the earnings announcement and other firm character-
istics known to affect the relation between returns and earnings.
In contrast to some beliefs that the market overreacts to announced earnings
that fall just short of an earnings threshold (i.e., a torpedo effect), we find little
evidence of this. For none of our thresholds do we find convincing evidence that
the market reaction per dollar of unexpected earnings or market reaction uncorre-
lated with unexpected earnings is unusually large for the group of firms that
barely miss the thresholds compared with all other groups. Although Skinner and
Sloan (2002) often are cited as providing evidence of a torpedo effect, they do not
2. While most prior studies investigate managers’ ability to manipulate accruals to avoid miss-
ing thresholds, recent research considers other mechanisms by which managers attempt to avoid miss-
ing thresholds, such as income classification shifting (Fan, Barua, Cready, & Thomas [2010]) and
real activities management (Cohen, Dey, & Lys [2008]).
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necessarily claim this result for barely missing. They show evidence of a negative
market reaction to missing the analyst forecast being more pronounced for high-
growth stocks. They do not, however, provide a detailed investigation of barely
missing and barely meeting the analyst forecast, and they do not control for the
magnitude of the earnings surprise. Furthermore, Payne and Thomas (2003) docu-
ment that the results reported by Skinner and Sloan (2002) do not hold after con-
trolling for classification errors that can arise from using Institutional Brokers
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) data adjusted for stock splits/dividends. Payne and
Thomas (2003) document that the differential price response for high-growth firms
tends to be when firms meet analysts’ forecasts, and not when they miss. We find
no evidence of a torpedo effect for low-growth or high-growth firms or for firms
that consistently have met the earnings threshold in recent quarters.
Although we find no evidence of a torpedo effect, managerial behavior to
avoid barely missing earnings targets still may be driven by other incentives,
such as managerial careers and other contractual obligations (Graham, Harvey, &
Rajgopal [2005]). We document a much larger population that barely meets expect-
ations than those that barely miss (e.g., Burgstahler & Dichev [1997]; DeGeorge,
Patel, & Zeckhauser [1999]; Payne & Thomas [2003]). Therefore, earnings man-
agement behavior around earnings thresholds is likely influenced by factors other
than market-based incentives. However, it could be that managers perceive market-
based incentives to exist, but we find no basis for this belief.
Section 2 discusses the research design. Section 3 details the sample selec-
tion and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 provides results, and Section 5
summarizes the study.
2. Research Design
Testing for the market reaction to earnings thresholds is not straightforward.
For example, to test for a differential market reaction to reporting earnings that
barely miss the prior period earnings threshold (i.e., reporting an earnings per
share decrease of $0.01), it is not enough to simply measure the announcement
return and compare that to the announcement return of firms that report earnings
that do not barely miss the prior period earnings threshold. We know this to be
true based on a multitude of studies that the market’s reaction to announced
earnings is largely dependent on the sign and magnitude of unexpected earnings
(e.g., Kothari [2001]; Nichols & Wahlen [2004]). If average unexpected earnings
for the sample of firms that barely misses the threshold differs from the average
unexpected earnings of other firms, then market reactions are expected to differ,
but not because of any torpedo effect. For example, suppose that firms that
report an earnings decrease of $0.01 have unexpected earnings that are on aver-
age more negative than unexpected earnings reported by firms that do not report
an earnings decrease of $0.01. In this case, firms reporting an earnings decrease
of $0.01 are expected to have more negative announcement returns, but not because
of a torpedo effect. The more negative market reaction of these firms is due simply
to them reporting more negative unexpected earnings on average.
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In addition, prior research provides evidence that differences in firm charac-
teristics can lead to differences in the market’s reaction to announced earnings.
To the extent that firm characteristics differ across groups, conclusions of a tor-
pedo effect are confounded. Therefore, to test the market’s reaction to earnings
thresholds, we employ a comprehensive approach that controls for both unexpected
earnings and several firm characteristics. We explain these firm characteristics and
their importance in more detail below.
We begin with a basic model that cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are a
function of unexpected earnings (UE).
CARi;q ¼ b1UEi;q þ ei;q ð1Þ
For our study, CAR is measured as the three-day market-adjusted return sur-
rounding the earnings announcement (i.e., day 1 to þ1) for firm i in quarter q.
UE is defined as reported earnings less the last available individual analyst fore-
cast, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter. b1 is the slope coeffi-
cient measuring the market reaction per dollar of UE. To test for a torpedo
effect, we consider the average market reaction unrelated to UE by adding an
intercept term and introducing an indicator variable (D) for reported earnings that
barely miss the earnings threshold.
CARi;q ¼ I1 þ I2Di;q þ b1UEi;q þ ei;q ð2Þ
I2 measures the average incremental market reaction unrelated to UE for
firms that barely miss the earnings thresholds. I1 measures the average market
reaction unrelated to unexpected earnings for all other firms. A torpedo effect
would suggest that the average market reaction would be more negative for firms
that barely miss, indicating that I2 will be negative.
We also consider that the market’s perception of earnings persistence could
differ across firms, which would be revealed in differential slope coefficients. To
control for this possibility, we also measure the incremental slope coefficient (b2)
to barely missing the earnings threshold. Allowing both the intercept and slope
coefficients to vary gives us a more complete understanding of whether the market
reaction to earnings thresholds varies.
CARi;q ¼ I1 þ I2Di;q þ b1UEi;q þ b2UEi;qDi;q þ ei;q ð3Þ
To be complete in our empirical investigation, we modify eq. (3) by classi-
fying all sample firms into one of four mutually exclusive and collectively ex-
haustive groups:
Easily Miss ¼ Firms reporting earnings that easily miss the earnings threshold.
Barely Miss ¼ Firms reporting earnings that barely miss the earnings threshold.
Barely Meet ¼ Firms reporting earnings that barely meet the earnings thresh-
old.
Easily Meet ¼ Firms reporting earnings that easily meet the earnings threshold.
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The full model becomes:
CARi;q ¼
X4
d¼1
Id
Dd;i;q þ bdUEd;i;q
 þ ei;q ð4Þ
eq. (4) provides a tractable way to compare intercept effects and slope effects
across the four groups. In other words, these estimates allow us to determine
whether the market reaction to unexpected earnings differs for firms that barely
miss the earnings threshold compared with other firms.
We define barely meeting (missing) the analyst forecast threshold as reporting
an earnings surprise of $0.00 to 0.02 ($0.01 to $0.03) per share.3 We define
barely meeting (missing) the prior period earnings threshold as reporting a change
in earnings of $0.00 to $0.02 ($0.01 to $0.03) per share. We define barely meet-
ing (missing) the zero earnings threshold as reporting earnings of $0.00 to $0.03
($0.01 to $0.04) per share. The decision about which amounts to include as
barely meeting and barely missing is somewhat arbitrary. Amounts are chosen so
that a small portion of the sample falls into the ‘‘barely’’ category, while enough
observations remain to provide reliable tests. As we detail below, the number of
observations falling into the barely missing and barely meeting category are, respec-
tively, as follows: analyst forecast (15.0 percent and 39.2 percent), prior period earn-
ings (6.2 percent and 10.4 percent), and zero earnings (2.0 percent and 3.9 percent).
In Table 1, we provide the distributions of reported earnings relative to each thresh-
old for our sample of firms. As expected, the distributions for each of the three
thresholds show an unusual pattern at the point of the threshold, suggesting that man-
agers could be responding to market-based incentives to avoid missing thresholds.4
A final consideration is the extent to which firm characteristics differ across
the four groups. Bartov, Lynn, and Ronen (2005) specifically address the impor-
tance of control variables and other research design issues when making inferences
about the market’s reaction to announced earnings. We add a number of control
variables to eq. (4) that potentially affect the market’s reaction to announced earn-
ings. We control for nonlinearity in the returns/earnings relation (LIN), forecast dis-
persion (DISP), firm size (SIZE), beta (BETA), market-to-book ratio (MB), and
timeliness of analysts’ forecasts (AGE). Each variable is defined as follows:
3. We also have considered $0.02 intervals (i.e., $0.00 to $0.01 and $0.01 to $0.02) and
obtain similar results.
4. The distributions for our sample of firms are very similar to those reported in Payne and
Thomas (2003).
LIN ¼ square root of the absolute value of UE.
DISP ¼ the standard deviation of forecasts included in the most recent consensus
forecast, scaled by price at the beginning of the quarter.
SIZE ¼ the log of market capitalization the day before the three-day earnings
announcement period.
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TABLE 1
Distribution of Reported Earnings Near Each Threshold
Earnings
Interval
Analyst
Forecast
Prior Period
Earnings
Zero
Earnings
< 0.10 5,537 14,693 7,524
0.10 588 958 340
0.09 713 1,023 383
0.08 882 1,104 369
0.07 1,009 1,239 375
0.06 1,199 1,324 408
0.05 1,613 1,478 443
0.04 2,028 1,557 458
0.03 2,682 1,726 458
0.02 4,029 1,818 444
0.01 6,444 1,889 359
0.00 13,570 2,634 552
0.01 12,072 3,022 976
0.02 8,817 3,491 989
0.03 5,919 3,779 925
0.04 4,261 3,945 934
0.05 3,147 3,977 1,069
0.06 2,296 3,797 1,026
0.07 1,693 3,405 987
0.08 1,471 3,048 1,017
0.09 1,118 2,605 942
0.10 969 2,468 1,163
> 0.10 5,813 22,890 65,729
Total 87,870 87,870 87,870
Note: The analyst forecast threshold is defined as the last individual analyst’s forecast. The prior pe-
riod earnings threshold is defined as earnings reported in the same quarter in the previous year. All earnings
variables are those reported by Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) in per share amounts. The
total sample size is 87,870 firm-quarter observations, as detailed in Table 2.
BETA ¼ slope from the standard market model using daily returns and the equally
weighted market index over a sixty-day return interval ending the day
before the three-day earnings announcement period.
MB ¼ the ratio of market value to book value at the end of the current quarter.
AGE ¼ the number of trading days between the last individual analyst forecast
and the earnings announcement.
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Prior research documents a nonlinearity (S-shaped relation) in the market’s response
to unexpected earnings (Freeman & Tse [1992]; Kinney, Burgstahler, & Martin
[2002]; Bartov, Lynn, & Ronen [2005]). We control for this expected S-shaped rela-
tion by including the square root of the absolute value of unexpected earnings (LIN).
For two of our threshold tests (i.e., zero earnings and prior period earnings) this S-
shaped relation is not expected to center on the earnings threshold. For the analyst
forecast threshold (which provides a direct measure of unexpected earnings), the S-
shaped relation is expected to center on the threshold, consistent with prior research.
We can then test whether the analyst forecast threshold elicits an incremental market
reaction beyond the already expected S-shape relation documented in the literature.
In other words, we can test for a kink in the S-shaped relation (i.e., an extra market
penalty for barely missing the analyst forecast threshold) if a torpedo effect exists.
Simply because the S-shaped relation predicts a larger market reaction per
dollar of negative unexpected earnings for firms that barely miss compared with
those that easily miss, this is not necessarily evidence of a torpedo effect if one con-
siders a more comprehensive view of the returns-earnings relation. The S-shaped
relation also predicts a larger market reaction per dollar of positive unexpected
earnings to barely meeting compared with easily meeting. Therefore, finding a
more negative market reaction to unexpected earnings for barely missing compared
with easily missing cannot alone be concluded as evidence of a torpedo effect,
unless one also is willing to conclude that there is an extra market reward for barely
meeting compared with easily meeting. This is why we provide tests that compare
the market reaction of barely missing with the market reaction of barely meeting
(in addition to barely missing versus easily missing).
DISP controls for measurement error in unexpected earnings. As forecast
dispersion increases, any analyst’s forecast is less likely to represent actual market
expectations, resulting in measurement error and a downwardly biased slope coeffi-
cient. Thus, the coefficient on the interaction of DISP and UE is expected to be
negative. SIZE, BETA, and MB control for additional variables that relate to the
magnitude of the market’s response to unexpected earnings (Freeman [1987]; Col-
lins & Kothari [1989]; Easton & Zmijewski [1989]). We expect both SIZE and
BETA to relate negatively to the slope coefficient, and MB to relate positively.5
AGE provides an additional control for measurement error in unexpected earnings.
Research shows that forecast optimism increases as the forecast horizon expands
(e.g., O’Brien [1988]; Brown [2001]; Richardson, Teoh, & Wysocki [2004]). The
further the forecast date from the earnings announcement date, the more likely that
the analyst forecast is greater than the true market expectations at the earnings
announcement.6 Thus, the market reaction to announced earnings will be more pos-
itive (or less negative) for a given level of forecast error as the age of the forecast
5. We also used analysts’ long-term earnings growth forecasts as a measure of expected growth,
instead of the market-to-book ratio. Using this alternative variable had no impact on conclusions.
6. The mean (median) number of trading days between the earnings announcement and the last
individual analyst forecast used to calculate unexpected earnings is 10.3 (9) for our sample.
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increases. Unlike the other control variables that are interacted with unexpected
earnings, we include AGE as a noninteracted independent variable and expect it to
have a positive coefficient. Thus, our full model becomes:
CARi;q ¼
X4
d¼1
Id
Dd;i;q þ bdUEd;i;q
 þ b5DISPi;q þ b6SIZEi;q þ b7BETAi;q
þb8MBi;q þ b9AGEi;q þ b10UEi;qLINi;q þ b11UEi;qDISPi;q
þb12UEi;qSIZEi;q þ b13UEi;qBETAi;q þ b14UEi;qMBi;q þ ei;q ð5Þ
3. Sample and Descriptive Statistics
The initial sample consists of 188,582 firm-quarter observations that have
the necessary actual earnings and earnings forecast data from I/B/E/S and returns
data from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for the years 1985–
2006. As detailed in Table 2, the sample reduces for the following reasons: miss-
ing control variables (dispersion, market capitalization, and forecast age) from
I/B/E/S (22,656), missing market-to-book ratios from Compustat (57,094), negative
book values (1,444), firms in regulated industries (SIC code between 4400 and
5000 or between 6000 and 6500) (16,038), and firms in the top or bottom percen-
tile of announcement period return or forecast error each year (3,480). The final
sample includes 87,870 firm-quarter observations.
Announcement period returns are the three-day market-adjusted cumulative
abnormal returns around the earnings announcement date (day 1 to þ1). Unex-
pected earnings equal reported quarterly earnings minus the most recent individual
analyst forecast before the earnings announcement. We also compare reported earn-
ings with the most recent individual analyst forecast to determine whether the firm
meets the analyst forecast threshold. The change in earnings equals current quarter
earnings minus earnings of the same quarter in the previous year. All earnings vari-
ables are those reported by I/B/E/S, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the
quarter. We adjust the I/B/E/S data by the split factor (Payne & Thomas [2003]).
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics. Panel A shows average amounts for
the analyst forecast (prior period earnings) [zero earnings] threshold. Panel B
provides distributional statistics for CAR and UE. One noticeable result in Panel
A is that average market reactions differ across groups. For example, CAR is most
negative (positive) for firms that report earnings that easily miss (easily meet) ana-
lysts’ forecasts. However, this reaction makes sense when one considers how UE
differs across groups. UE is most negative (positive) for firms that report large neg-
ative (positive) analyst forecast errors. These results demonstrate the difficulty
of relying on simple statistics to make conclusions regarding a torpedo effect. Fur-
thermore, firm characteristics differ across groups. Firms easily missing analysts’
forecasts tend to have more extreme earnings (i.e., expected nonlinearity in the
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returns-earnings relation), higher dispersion, lower market-to-book ratios, lower
earnings levels, and more negative changes in earnings. The same conclusions can
be made for the prior period earnings and zero earnings thresholds.
The distribution statistics reported in Panel B indicate similar results for CAR
and UE for each threshold. Because the magnitude of UE is known to affect the
returns-earnings relation and because it varies across groups, it represents an omit-
ted correlated variable if not included in the model, potentially affecting infer-
ences regarding the market’s reaction to reported earnings. Therefore, we base
conclusions of a torpedo effect on our multivariate model instead of simple statis-
tics of CAR.
4. Results
4.1 Tests of Threshold Effects
Prior research investigates three earnings thresholds: analyst forecasts, prior
period earnings, and zero earnings. Anecdotes about the torpedo effect typically
focus on the analyst forecast threshold (e.g., Levitt [1998]) so we present this anal-
ysis first followed by an examination of the prior period earnings threshold (i.e.,
change in reported earnings) and then zero earnings threshold (i.e., the level of
reported earnings).
TABLE 2
Sample Selection
Firm-Quarter
Observations
Firms with nonmissing returns data from CRSP and nonmissing actual
earnings and earnings forecast data from I/B/E/S over the 1985–2006
period 188,582
Less: Firms with missing control variables from I/B/E/S (dispersion, market
capitalization, and forecast age) (22,656)
Less: Firms with missing market-to-book ratios from Compustat (57,094)
Less: Firms with negative book values (1,444)
Less: Firms in regulated industries (SIC code between 4400 and 5000 or
between 6000 and 6500) (16,038)
Less: Outliers (firms having the top or bottom percentile of announcement
period return or forecast error in a year) (3,480)
Final Sample 87,870
Note: CRSP ¼ Center for Research in Security Prices; I/B/E/S ¼Institutional Brokers’ Estimate Sys-
tem; SIC¼ Standard Industrial Classification.
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Table 4 reports the results of eq. (5) for the analyst forecast threshold. We
show results for three versions of eq. (5). Column 1 includes intercepts, slopes, and
control variables; column 2 includes intercepts and slopes but no control variables;
column 3 contains only intercepts and control variables. To conclude that a thresh-
old effect exists, we require the following. For firms that barely miss the threshold,
either (1) their intercept should be more negative than the intercepts of all other
groups, or (2) their slope coefficient on UE should be more positive than the slope
coefficients of all other groups. A more negative intercept indicates a greater mar-
ket penalty uncorrelated with the amount of unexpected earnings. A more positive
slope coefficient indicates a greater reaction per dollar of unexpected earnings. If
we cannot find evidence that the market reaction of the barely miss group is more
extreme compared with all other groups, then we cannot conclude that this group is
‘‘special’’ (i.e., that a torpedo effect exists).
For the analysis with intercepts, slopes, and control variables (column 1), we
find that the intercept for the barely miss group is negative (0.007) and signifi-
cant at the 0.05 level. For the easily miss group, the intercept is also negative
(0.011), significant at the 0.01 level, and significantly more negative than the
intercept of the barely miss group at the 0.01 level. Furthermore, the slope coeffi-
cient for the barely miss group (3.340) is the lowest among all groups, suggesting
that the market reaction per dollar of unexpected earnings is not unusually large.
Overall, we conclude that there is no evidence of a torpedo effect associated with
barely missing the analyst forecast threshold.
In column 2 of Table 4, we provide results with intercepts and slopes, but
without control variables. As expected, compared with the model with control vari-
ables, slope coefficients are noticeably smaller. Furthermore, those groups closer to
zero unexpected earnings (i.e., barely miss and barely meet) have larger slope coef-
ficients compared with other groups. This is consistent with a greater linear relation
between unexpected returns and unexpected earnings near zero unexpected earn-
ings, that is, the S-shaped relation discussed earlier (Kinney, Burgstahler, & Martin
[2002]). If one compares only the slope coefficients for barely missing and easily
missing, then at first one might consider this evidence of a torpedo effect. However,
it is important to view the results of the full model. The coefficient for barely meet-
ing is greater than all other slope coefficients. Thus, if one considers that the
‘‘large’’ coefficient on barely missing is unusual (compared to easily missing) and
therefore evidence of the torpedo effect, one must also conclude that the response
to barely meeting is even more unusual (i.e., firms get an even greater reward for
barely meeting), which is not consistent with the notion of a torpedo effect. Thus,
we conclude that whether control variables are included or not, we find no consist-
ent evidence of a torpedo effect.
In column 3 of Table 4, we provide results with intercepts only. Notice that
the intercepts relate closely to the mean CARs in Table 3; for example, the intercept
for easily missing is 0.022 in Table 4 and 0.0204 in Table 3 (after division by
100). This serves as confirmation that our interpretation of the descriptive statistics
in Table 3 goes unchanged in our analyses using Fama and MacBeth (1973)
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TABLE 4
Market Reaction to Reporting Earnings That Barely Meet/Miss or Easily
Meet/Miss the Analyst Forecast Threshold (N ¼ 87,870)
Panel A: Regression coefficients
(1) (2) (3)
Intercepts:
I1 (Easily Miss) 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.022***
I2 (Barely Miss) 0.007** 0.011*** 0.013***
I3 (Barely Meet) 0.003 0.000 0.002**
I4 (Easily Meet) 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.019***
Slopes:
b1 (Easily Miss) 3.561*** 0.384***
b2 (Barely Miss) 3.340*** 1.287***
b3 (Barely Meet) 5.421*** 2.826**
b4 (Easily Meet) 4.187*** 1.077***
Controls Yes No Yes
Panel B: Tests of differences in intercepts and slopes
Intercept Differences (Ha: I2  I1 < 0 and I2 – I3 < 0)
I2 (Barely Miss) vs. I1 (Easily Miss) 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.009***
I2 (Barely Miss) vs. I3 (Barely Meet) 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.014***
Slope Differences (Ha: b2  b1 > 0 and b2  b3 > 0)
b2 (Barely Miss) vs. b1 (Easily Miss) 0.221 0.903**
b2 (Barely Miss) vs. b3 (Barely Meet) 2.081 1.538
Note: Each firm-quarter observation falls into one (and only one) of the four groups. For the analyst
forecast threshold, we define barely meeting (missing) the threshold as reporting an earnings surprise of
$0.00 to $0.02 ($0.01 to $0.03) per share. The relation between announcement returns and unexpected
earnings for each of these four groups is estimated using the following model:
CARi;q¼
X4
d¼1
Id
Dd;i;q þ bdUEd;i;q
 þ b5DISPi;q þ b6SIZEi;q þ b7BETAi;q
þ b8MBi;q þ b9AGEi;q þ b10UEi;qLINi;q þ b11UEi;qDISPi;q
þ b12UEi;qSIZEi;q þ b13UEi;qBETAi;q þ b14UEi;qMBi;q þ ei;q
***, ** denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test using the
Fama and Macbeth (1973) procedure. Reported amounts are averages of annual coefficients.
Variable Definitions:
Dd,i,q equals one for firm i in quarter q in group d, zero otherwise. See Table 3 for other variable defini-
tions and group descriptions.
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regressions with the inclusion of control variables. Although the intercepts for both
easily missing and barely missing are significantly negative, easily missing is sig-
nificantly more negative, indicating a greater negative reaction to earnings that eas-
ily miss the analyst forecast threshold.
Table 5 provides results for the prior period earnings threshold. We find no
evidence of a torpedo effect. For the full sample with control variables, we find that
the intercepts and slope coefficients for firms that barely miss the prior period earn-
ings threshold are not significantly different from those of firms that easily miss or
barely meet the threshold. When we do not include control variables or when we
exclude slope coefficients, conclusions do not change. The only significant differ-
ence we find is the intercept for easily missing is significantly more negative than
is the coefficient for barely missing, inconsistent with a torpedo effect. Thus, across
all of these tests, we detect no evidence that the market reaction to barely missing
the prior period earnings threshold is unusual.
Table 6 provides results for the zero earnings threshold. Here, we again find
no evidence of a torpedo effect. With only one exception, all differences in inter-
cepts and slope coefficients are not significant across our tests. The one excep-
tion includes the slope coefficient for barely missing being significantly less than
the slope coefficient for barely meeting in the model excluding control variables.
This result is not consistent with a greater market reaction to barely missing the
zero earnings threshold. In conclusion, across three thresholds, for models with
and without control variables, we detect no consistent evidence of a torpedo
effect.
4.2 Influence of Growth Expectations and History of
Meeting Earnings Thresholds
In this section, we consider whether any torpedo effect may be isolated to
certain types of firms. First, some may suggest that ‘‘glamour’’ stocks (i.e., those
with high expected growth) are especially susceptible to investor disappointment
(Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny [1994]), exacerbating any torpedo effect. There-
fore, in our first test, we partition the sample into low expected growth versus high
expected growth based on the median market-to-book ratio at the end of the current
quarter. One might expect to observe more evidence of a torpedo effect for high
market-to-book firms. As shown in the first two columns of Table 7 for the analyst
forecast threshold, the results for the low-growth and high-growth samples are sim-
ilar to one another and neither shows consistent evidence of a torpedo effect for
barely missing. The first two columns of Table 8 (Table 9) provide results of low-
growth and high-growth firms for the prior period earnings (zero earnings) thresh-
old. We observe no evidence of a torpedo effect for these thresholds.
Second, we examine whether the company’s history of meeting a threshold
impacts conclusions of a torpedo effect for barely missing in the current period
(Kim [2002]). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find that the distributions of reported
earnings levels and earnings changes become more kinked just below zero as the
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TABLE 5
Market Reaction to Reporting Earnings That Barely Meet/Miss or Easily
Meet/Miss the Prior Period Earnings Threshold (N ¼ 87,870)
Panel A: Regression coefficients
(1) (2) (3)
Intercepts:
I1 (Easily Miss) 0.000 0.007*** 0.010***
I2 (Barely Miss) 0.000 0.006*** 0.005***
I3 (Barely Meet) 0.001 0.004*** 0.003***
I4 (Easily Meet) 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.008***
Slopes:
b1 (Easily Miss) 5.656*** 1.577***
b2 (Barely Miss) 5.527*** 2.212***
b3 (Barely Meet) 6.027*** 2.852***
b4 (Easily Meet) 6.118*** 2.628***
Controls Yes No Yes
Panel B: Tests of differences in intercepts and slopes
Intercept Differences (Ha: I2  I1 < 0 and I2  I1 < 0)
I2 (Barely Miss) vs. I1 (Easily Miss) 0.000 0.001 0.005***
I2 (Barely Miss) vs. I3 (Barely Meet) 0.001 0.002 0.002
Slope Differences (Ha: b2  b1 > 0 and b2  b3 > 0)
b2 (Barely Miss) vs. b1 (Easily Miss) 0.129 0.635
b2 (Barely Miss) vs. b3 (Barely Meet) 0.500 0.640
Note: Each firm-quarter observation falls into one (and only one) of the four groups. For the prior pe-
riod earnings threshold, we define barely meeting (missing) the threshold as reporting change in earnings of
$0.00 to $0.02 ($0.01 to $0.03) per share. The relation between announcement returns and unexpected
earnings for each of these four groups is estimated using the following model:
CARi;q¼
X4
d¼1
Id
Dd;i;q þ bdUEd;i;q
 þ b5DISPi;q þ b6SIZEi;q þ b7BETAi;q
þb8MBi;q þ b9AGEi;q þ b10UEi;qLINi;q þ b11UEi;qDISPi;q
þb12UEi;qSIZEi;q þ b13UEi;qBETAi;q þ b14UEi;qMBi;q þ ei;q
***, ** denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test using the
Fama and Macbeth (1973) procedure. Reported amounts are averages of annual coefficients.
Variable Definitions:
Dd,i,q equals one for firm i in quarter q in group d, zero otherwise. See Table 3 for other variable defini-
tions and group descriptions.
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TABLE 6
Market Reaction to Reporting Earnings That Barely Meet/Miss or Easily
Meet/Miss the Zero Earnings Threshold (N ¼ 87,870)
Panel A: Regression coefficients
(1) (2) (3)
Intercepts:
I1 (Easily Miss) 0.002 0.009*** 0.010***
I2 (Barely Miss) 0.003 0.008*** 0.008***
I3 (Barely Meet) 0.003 0.006*** 0.007***
I4 (Easily Meet) 0.004 0.001 0.004***
Slopes:
b1 (Easily Miss) 6.444*** 0.999***
b2 (Barely Miss) 6.389*** 1.575***
b3 (Barely Meet) 6.885*** 2.407***
b4 (Easily Meet) 7.785*** 3.651***
Controls Yes No Yes
Panel B: Tests of differences in intercepts and slopes
Intercept Differences (Ha: I2  I1 < 0 and I2 – I3 < 0)
I2 (Barely Miss) vs. I1 (Easily Miss) 0.001 0.001 0.002
I2 (Barely Miss) vs. I3 (Barely Meet) 0.000 0.002 0.001
Slope Differences (Ha: b2  b1 > 0 and b2 – b3 > 0)
b2 (Barely Miss) vs. b1 (Easily Miss) 0.055 0.576
b2 (Barely Miss) vs. b3 (Barely Meet) 0.496 0.832**
Note: Each firm-quarter observation falls into one (and only one) of the four groups. For the zero earn-
ings threshold, we define barely meeting (missing) the threshold as reporting earnings of $0.00 to $0.03
($0.01 to $0.04) per share. The relation between announcement returns and unexpected earnings for
each of these four groups is estimated using the following model:
CARi;q¼
X4
d¼1
Id
Dd;i;q þ bdUEd;i;q
 þ b5DISPi;q þ b6SIZEi;q þ b7BETAi;q
þb8MBi;q þ b9AGEi;q þ b10UEi;qLINi;q þ b11UEi;qDISPi;q
þb12UEi;qSIZEi;q þ b13UEi;qBETAi;q þ b14UEi;qMBi;q þ ei;q
***, ** denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test using the
Fama and Macbeth (1973) procedure. Reported amounts are averages of annual coefficients.
Variable Definitions:
Dd,i,q equals one for firm i in quarter q in group d, zero otherwise. See Table 3 for other variable defini-
tions and group descriptions.
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TABLE 7
Market Reaction to Reporting Earnings That Barely Meet/Miss or Easily
Meet/Miss the Analyst Forecast Threshold, Conditioned on Growth Expecta-
tions and History of Meeting
Panel A: Regression coefficients
Low
Growth
High
Growth
Meet Past
Two Qtrs.
Meet Past
Four Qtrs.
Intercepts:
I1 (Easily Miss) 0.004 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.021***
I2 (Barely Miss) 0.002 0.019*** 0.016** 0.017**
I3 (Barely Meet) 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.008
I4 (Easily Meet) 0.017*** 0.008 0.009 0.005
Slopes:
b1 (Easily Miss) 4.129*** 6.576*** 3.822** 9.564**
b2 (Barely Miss) 3.361*** 7.561*** 2.976** 11.358**
b3 (Barely Meet) 5.750*** 11.233*** 8.760*** 13.157***
b4 (Easily Meet) 4.841*** 7.018*** 5.367*** 10.680***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 43,928 43,942 45,412 28,231
Panel B: Tests of Differences in Intercepts and Slopes
Intercept Differences (Ha: I2  I1 < 0 and I2 – I3 < 0)
I2 (Barely Miss) vs. I1 (Easily Miss) 0.006** 0.001 0.006** 0.004
I2 (Barely Miss) vs. I3 (Barely Meet) 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009**
Slope Differences (Ha: b2  b1 > 0 and b2  b3 > 0)
b2 (Barely Miss) vs. b1 (Easily Miss) 0.768 0.985 0.846 1.794
b2 (Barely Miss) vs. b3 (Barely Meet) 2.389 3.672 5.784* 1.799
Note: Each firm-quarter observation falls into one (and only one) of the four groups. For the analyst
forecast threshold, we define barely meeting (missing) the threshold as reporting an earnings surprise of
$0.00 to $0.02 ($0.01 to $0.03) per share. The relation between announcement returns and unexpected
earnings for each of these four groups is estimated using the following model:
CARi;q¼
X4
d¼1
Id
Dd;i;q þ bdUEd;i;q
 þ b5DISPi;q þ b6SIZEi;q þ b7BETAi;q
þb8MBi;q þ b9AGEi;q þ b10UEi;qLINi;q þ b11UEi;qDISPi;q
þb12UEi;qSIZEi;q þ b13UEi;qBETAi;q þ b14UEi;qMBi;q þ ei;q
***, ** denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test using the
Fama and Macbeth (1973) procedure. Reported amounts are averages of annual coefficients.
Variable Definitions:
Dd,i,q equals one for firm i in quarter q in group d, zero otherwise. See Table 3 for other variable defini-
tions and group descriptions. The low (high) growth sample consists of observations that have a market-to-
book ratio at the end of the quarter less than (greater than or equal to) the median in each year. Firms classi-
fied as meeting the threshold for two (four) quarters are those that report earnings that meet or exceed the an-
alyst forecast for at least the prior two (four) quarters.
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TABLE 8
Market Reaction to Reporting Earnings That Barely Meet/Miss or Easily
Meet/Miss the Prior Period Earnings Threshold, Conditioned on Growth
Expectations and History of Meeting
Panel A: Regression coefficients
Low
Growth
High
Growth
Meet Past
Two Qtrs.
Meet Past
Four Qtrs.
Intercepts:
I1 (Easily Miss) 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.007
I2 (Barely Miss) 0.006 0.012** 0.008 0.008
I3 (Barely Meet) 0.008 0.011** 0.004 0.006
I4 (Easily Meet) 0.015*** 0.003 0.004 0.002
Slopes:
b1 (Easily Miss) 5.378*** 8.949*** 10.711*** 13.175***
b2 (Barely Miss) 5.285*** 8.803*** 10.633*** 13.745***
b3 (Barely Meet) 5.935*** 8.999*** 10.144*** 13.659***
b4 (Easily Meet) 5.751*** 9.401*** 11.274*** 14.048***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 43,928 43,942 45,277 31,199
Panel B: Tests of differences in intercepts and slopes
Intercept Differences (Ha: I2  I1 < 0 and I2 – I3 < 0)
I2 (Barely Miss) vs. I1 (Easily Miss) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
I2 (Barely Miss) vs. I3 (Barely Meet) 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002
Slope Differences (Ha: b2  b1 > 0 and b2  b3 > 0)
b2 (Barely Miss) vs. b1 (Easily Miss) 0.095 0.146 0.078 0.570
b2 (Barely Miss) vs. b3 (Barely Meet) 0.650 0.196 0.489 0.086
Note: Each firm-quarter observation falls into one (and only one) of the four groups. For the prior pe-
riod earnings threshold, we define barely meeting (missing) the threshold as reporting change in earnings of
$0.00 to $0.02 ($0.01 to $0.03) per share. The relation between announcement returns and unexpected
earnings for each of these four groups is estimated using the following model:
CARi;q¼
X4
d¼1
Id
Dd;i;q þ bdUEd;i;q
 þ b5DISPi;q þ b6SIZEi;q þ b7BETAi;q
þb8MBi;q þ b9AGEi;q þ b10UEi;qLINi;q þ b11UEi;qDISPi;q
þb12UEi;qSIZEi;q þ b13UEi;qBETAi;q þ b14UEi;qMBi;q þ ei;q
***, ** denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test using the Fama
and Macbeth (1973) procedure. Reported amounts are averages of annual coefficients.
Variable Definition:
Dd,i,q equals one for firm i in quarter q in group d, zero otherwise. See Table 3 for other variable defini-
tions and group descriptions. The low (high) growth sample consists of observations that have a market-to-
book ratio at the end of the quarter less than (greater than or equal to) the median in each year. Firms classi-
fied as meeting the threshold for two (four) quarters are those that report earnings that meet or exceed the
prior period earnings threshold for at least the prior two (four) quarters.
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TABLE 9
Market Reaction to Reporting Earnings That Barely Meet/Miss or Easily
Meet/Miss the Zero Earnings Threshold, Conditioned on Growth Expecta-
tions and History Of Meeting
Panel A: Regression coefficients
Low
Growth
High
Growth
Meet Past
Four Qtrs.
Meet Past
Eight Qtrs.
Intercepts:
I1 (Easily Miss) 0.006 0.016*** 0.004 0.011
I2 (Barely Miss) 0.011 0.019*** 0.001 0.015
I3 (Barely Meet) 0.006 0.013** 0.011*** 0.009
I4 (Easily Meet) 0.012** 0.010 0.001 0.001
Slopes:
b1 (Easily Miss) 5.759*** 11.187*** 14.581*** 17.458***
b2 (Barely Miss) 6.124*** 10.557*** 13.819*** 15.541***
b3 (Barely Meet) 6.384*** 11.607*** 12.928*** 15.118***
b4 (Easily Meet) 6.862*** 13.306*** 14.598*** 17.111***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 43,928 43,942 65,539 50,513
Panel B: Tests of differences in intercepts and slopes
Intercept Differences (Ha: I2  I1 < 0 and I2 – I3 < 0)
I2 (Barely Miss) vs. I1 (Easily Miss) 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.026
I2 (Barely Miss) vs. I3 (Barely Meet) 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.006
Slope Differences (Ha: b2  b1 > 0 and b2  b3 > 0)
b2 (Barely Miss) vs. b1 (Easily Miss) 0.365 0.630 0.762 1.917
b2 (Barely Miss) vs. b3 (Barely Meet) 0.260 1.050 0.891 0.423
Note: Each firm-quarter observation falls into one (and only one) of the four groups. For the zero earn-
ings threshold, we define barely meeting (missing) the threshold as reporting earnings of $0.00 to $0.03
($0.01 to $0.04) per share. The relation between announcement returns and unexpected earnings for
each of these four groups is estimated using the following model:
CARi;q¼
X4
d¼1
Id
Dd;i;q þ bdUEd;i;q
 þ b5DISPi;q þ b6SIZEi;q þ b7BETAi;q
þb8MBi;q þ b9AGEi;q þ b10UEi;qLINi;q þ b11UEi;qDISPi;q
þb12UEi;qSIZEi;q þ b13UEi;qBETAi;q þ b14UEi;qMBi;q þ ei;q
***, ** denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test using the
Fama and Macbeth (1973) procedure. Reported amounts are averages of annual coefficients.
Variable Definitions:
Dd,i,q equals one for firm i in quarter q in group d, zero otherwise. See Table 3 for other variable defini-
tions and group descriptions. The low (high) growth sample consists of observations that have a market-to-
book ratio at the end of the quarter less than (greater than or equal to) the median in each year. Firms classi-
fied as meeting the threshold for four (eight) quarters are those that report earnings that meet or exceed the
zero earnings threshold for at least the prior four (eight) quarters.
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firm’s history of meeting the benchmark increases. Thus, investors may be espe-
cially disappointed if the firm misses an earnings target in the current quarter after
having achieved it for the past several quarters. For the analyst forecast and prior
period earnings thresholds, we examine firms that met the threshold for at least the
past two quarters or at least the past four quarters. For the zero earnings threshold,
we examine firms that met the threshold for at least the past four quarters or at
least the past eight quarters. We are able to examine a longer history for the zero
earnings threshold because of the greater number of firms that achieve this. Only
about 12.9 percent (18.2%) of the sample observations achieve the analyst fore-
cast (prior period earnings) threshold for at least eight consecutive quarters.
Given that we have four groups per threshold (easily miss, barely miss, barely
meet, and easily meet), the relatively small number of observations provides less
reliable tests.
The results are presented in the final two columns of Tables 7, 8, and 9 for
the analyst forecast, prior period earnings, and zero earnings thresholds, respec-
tively. For firms that have consistently met the threshold, we find results similar
to those reported for the full sample. For none of the thresholds do we find evi-
dence that barely missing results in a more negative intercept or a more positive
slope coefficient compared with the other groups. We conclude that for each of
these groups, there is no consistent evidence of a torpedo effect.
4.3 Sensitivity Analyses
We first consider that in recent years firms more commonly disclose addi-
tional information at the time earnings are announced. Perhaps the disclosure
of additional information better helps investors understand the nature of barely
missing a threshold so there is less of a strong reaction when this occurs. If this
is the case, then we would expect to find more evidence of a torpedo effect
in the early years of our sample. To test this, we split the sample in half
(1985–1995 and 1996–2006). In untabulated analyses, we find that results are
consistent across the two subperiods. There is no evidence of a torpedo effect in
either subperiod.
Next, we consider whether our treatment for outliers affects inferences.
Recall that for our tests, we delete the extreme percentiles of CAR and UE. As a
sensitivity test, we instead winsorize these variables at the extreme percentiles. Our
results are not affected by this change.
As a third sensitivity test, we consider whether conclusions of a torpedo
effect change when we use each earnings threshold as our measure of UE. For
example, to test the zero earnings threshold, we use the level of reported earnings
per share (scaled by price) as UE, and for the prior period earnings threshold, we
use the change in earnings per share (scaled by price). Although we believe that the
analyst forecast error provides the superior measure of UE for all of our earnings
threshold tests, it could be that using these alternative definitions of UE based on
the corresponding threshold makes sense if a torpedo effect exists due to investors’
275THE TORPEDO EFFECT
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jaf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
behavioral biases. With these alternative measures of UE, we find results very simi-
lar to those reported in Tables 5, 6, 8, and 9. Specifically, we find that the inter-
cepts and slope coefficients for firms that barely miss the threshold are not
significantly different from those of firms that either easily miss or barely meet
the thresholds. Therefore, we continue to conclude that a torpedo effect does
not exist.
For the fourth sensitivity test, we consider whether evidence of a torpedo effect
might be greater in the fourth quarter versus the first three quarters. Prior research
provides the general conclusion that earnings management behavior is greater in
the fourth quarter (Givoly & Ronen [1981]; Jeter & Shivakumar [1999]; Jacob &
Jorgensen [2007]; Das, Shroff, & Zhang [2007]; Cohen, Mashruwala, & Zach
[2008]; Fan, Barua, Cready, & Thomas [2010]). We find that results are very simi-
lar in the fourth quarter versus first three quarters, and neither sample shows evi-
dence of a torpedo effect.
5. Conclusion
Extensive prior research provides evidence indicating that managers manage
earnings at three common earnings thresholds: zero earnings, prior period earnings,
and analyst forecasts. One rationale for this result is that managers face dispropor-
tionately large market penalties for barely missing an earnings threshold, prompting
managerial manipulation of reported earnings that otherwise would have fallen just
short of the threshold. We compare the market’s reaction to barely missing earnings
thresholds to the market’s reaction to easily missing and barely meeting earnings
thresholds. We find no consistent evidence of an extra market penalty for barely
missing any of the earnings thresholds. In other words, we find no evidence of a
torpedo effect.
This raises an important question. If short-term market incentives do not pro-
vide motivation for earnings management around thresholds, what incentives are
present? Although managers may perceive market-based incentives to avoid barely
missing earnings thresholds (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal [2005]), we are not able
to document short-term price reactions as being a valid motivation for this behav-
ior. Researchers should continue to explore managers’ beliefs related to market-
based incentives and investigate additional reasons why managers are motivated to
manipulate earnings at these thresholds.7
7. For example, Frankel, Mayew, and Sun (2010) test whether investor relations costs increase
when a firm misses the analyst forecast threshold by a penny. They document that conference call
length increases by 3 percent and conclude that while this result is statistically significant, it is not
economically meaningful. Thus, they are not able to document an economic rationale for why manag-
ers would take action to avoid barely missing the analyst forecast threshold.
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